Abstract-This paper investigates the question of whether a key agreement protocol with the same communication complexity as the original Diffie-Hellman protocol (DHP) (two messages with a single group element per message), and similar low computational overhead, can achieve forward secrecy against active attackers in a provable way. We answer this question in the affirmative by resorting to an old and elegant key agreement protocol: the Okamoto-Tanaka protocol [23] . We analyze a variant of the protocol (denoted mOT) which achieves the above goal. Moreover, due to the identity-based properties of mOT, even the sending of certificates (typical for authenticated DHPs) can be avoided in the protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the invention of the Diffie-Hellman protocol (DHP) [11] , much work has been dedicated to armor the protocol against active ("man in the middle") attacks. Designing authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocols has proven to be very challenging at the design and analysis level, especially when trying to optimize performance (both computation and communication). This line of work has been important not only from the practical point of view but also for understandings what are the essential limits for providing authentication to the DHP.
In particular, it has been shown that one can obtain an authenticated DH protocol with the same communication as the basic unauthenticated DHP (at least if one ignores the transmission of public key certificates); namely, a 2-message exchange where each party sends a single DH value, and where the two messages can be sent in any order. A prominent example of such protocols is MQV [19] (and its provablysecure variant HMQV [18] ) where the cost of computing a session key is as in the basic unauthenticated DHP plus half the cost of one exponentiation (i.e., one off-line exponentiation and 1.5 on-line exponentiations).
Protocols such as the 2-message MQV are "implicitlyauthenticated protocols;" that is, the information transmitted between the parties is computed without access to the parties' long-term secrets while the authentication is accomplished via the computation of the session key that involves the long-term private/public keys of the parties. Unfortunately, implicitlyauthenticated protocols, while offering superb performance, are inherently limited in their security against active attackers. Indeed, as shown in [18] , such protocols can achieve perfect forward secrecy (PFS) against passive attackers only.
Recall that PFS ensures that once a session key derived from a Diffie-Hellman value is erased from memory, there is no way to recover the session key even by an attacker that gains access to the long-term authentication keys of the parties after the session is established. PFS is a major security feature that sets DHPs apart from other key agreement protocols (such as those based in PK encryption) and is the main reason for the extensive use of DHPs in practice (e.g., IPsec and SSH). Adding PFS against active attackers to protocols like MQV requires increased communication in the form of additional messages and/or explicit signatures.
In this paper we investigate the theoretical and practical question of whether the limits of DHPs can be pushed further and obtain a protocol with full security against active attackers (including PFS) while preserving the communication complexity of a basic DHP (two messages with a single group element per message) and low computational overhead. We answer this question in the affirmative by departing from implicitly authenticated protocols and resorting to an old and elegant key agreement protocol: the Okamoto-Tanaka protocol [23] . We analyze a variant of the protocol (denoted mOT) which achieves the above minimal communication, incurs a negligible computational overhead relative to a basic DHP over an RSA group, and yet achieves provable security including full PFS against active attackers 1 . Moreover, due to the identity-based [26] properties of mOT, even the sending and verification of certificates is avoided in the protocol.
Our Results.
The protocol mOT we analyze is a "stripped down" version of the "affiliation-hiding" key exchange protocol by Jarecki et al. [16] (a version of key agreement where parties want to hide who certified their public keys). We remove all the extra steps designed to obtain affiliation-hiding (which is not a concern for our paper) and focus on the 2-message version of the [16] protocol (the latter includes a third message and the transmission of additional authentication information for the parties to confirm they indeed have the same key). We present a rigorous proof of security for mOT in the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) Key-Agreement Protocol model [5] . The security of the protocol in this model, including weak PFS (i.e., against passive attacks only), is proven in the random oracle model under the standard RSA assumption. For the proof of full PFS against active attackers (and only for this proof) we resort to non-black-box assumptions in the form of the "knowledge of exponent" assumptions. We stress that our goal is to prove full security (including full PFS) for the 2-message protocol without the extra key confirmation steps: indeed the 3-message protocol with key confirmation can be proven secure (including full PFS) under the standard RSA assumption without requiring extra assumptions (this proof is actually implicit in [16] ). Modified Okamoto-Tanaka (mOT). The modified OkamotoTanaka protocol mOT, is described in Figure 1 (for a precise specification see Section III). We describe the protocol as an identity-based protocol using a KGC (key generation center) as this setting provides added performance advantages to the protocol. Following [16] , we include hashing operation on identities as well as the hashing and squaring operations in the computation of the session key K (these steps are not part of the original Okamoto-Tanaka).
The Modified Okamoto-Tanaka (mOT ) Protocol Setting: A Key Generation Center (KGC) chooses RSA parameters N = pq (such that p and q are random safe primes), and exponents d, e, and a random generator g of QR N , the (cyclic) subgroup of quadratic residues modN . KGC publishes N, e, g, two hash functions H (with range QR N ) and H ′ (with range of the desired length of the session key), and distributes to each user U with identity idU a private key
Key agreement: A and B choose ephemeral private exponents x and y, respectively. Security Proof and Full PFS "for free". The security result that sets our protocol and work apart is our proof of full PFS for mOT, namely, perfect forward secrecy against fully active attackers. The proof of full PFS (and only this proof) requires two additional "non-black-box" assumptions: one is the wellknown KEA1 (knowledge of exponent) assumption [9] , [1] related to the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem and the second is similar in spirit but applies to the discrete logarithm problem (details in the full version). Enjoying full PFS is a major advantage of mOT relative to efficient two-message protocols such as MQV that can only offer weak PFS. Indeed, in spite of mOT transmitting a single group element in each of the two messages, it overcomes the inherent PFS limitations of implicitly authenticated DHPs by involving the sender's private key in the computation of each protocol's message. Most importantly, as we explain below, this full security against active attackers is achieved with zero communication and negligible computational overhead relative to the basic DHP. We believe this to be not just a practical feature of mOT but also a significant contribution to the theory of key agreement protocols showing that armoring the original DHP against active attackers can be achieved essentially "for free".
Performance. The cost of mOT remains essentially the same as in the basic (unauthenticated) DHP: one message per party, that can be sent in any order, with each message containing a single group element. No additional authentication information needs to be transmitted. Thanks to the identity-based properties of the protocol, public-key certificates need not be sent or verified. The only extra operation is one exponentiation to the e-th power, which can be chosen to be 3, and one squaring; that is, just three modular multiplications in all. However, note that mOT works over an RSA group and therefore exponentiations are more expensive than over elliptic curves (where protocols like MQV can be run). Yet, we also note that mOT can be implemented with short exponents, say 160-bit exponents when the modulus is of size 1024 (or a 224-bit exponent with a 2048-bit modulus). Our proof of the protocol holds in this case under the common assumption that in the RSA group the discrete logarithm problem remains hard also for these exponent sizes. In terms of practical efficiency, for moderate security parameters (160-200 bit exponents) the cost of one on-line exponentiation in mOT is competitive with the 1.5 exponentiations over elliptic curves required by MQV. For larger security parameters the advantage is fully on the elliptic curve side though in this case one has to also consider the overhead incurred by certificate processing in a protocol like MQV (which is costly especially for ECDSAsigned certificates). Of course, beyond the practical performance considerations, mOT holds a significant security advantage over 2-message MQV, namely, its full PFS against active attackers. The fact that mOT can do so well with almost no overhead over the underlying basic Diffie-Hellman protocol, and with full security against active attacks, is an important theoretical (and conceptual) aspect of our work pointing to the limits of what is possible in this area.
More discussion on the performance mOT can be found in the full version.
The Need for a Key Generation Center (KGC). As an identity-based protocol, mOT avoids the need for certificates (a significant communication and computational advantage). The id-based setting, however, introduces the need for a KGC that generates and distributes keys to users. This results in a different trust model than the traditional certification authority (CA) that certifies public keys but does not generate or know the private keys of parties. Note, however, that in mOT the private keys are used only for authentication. Thus, while a KGC can impersonate a party, it cannot learn keys exchanged by that party (we note -see full version -that the PFS property holds also against a corrupted KGC). Note that a regular CA can also impersonate parties at will by issuing certificates with the user's name but with a private key known to the CA. Interestingly, as we show below, mOT can be modified to work also in the traditional CA setting.
Further results. We extend the above proofs and analysis to a recent extension of the Okamoto-Tanaka protocol proposed by Schridde, Smith and Freisleben [27] that allows the execution of the protocol between users that belong to different domains, i.e., to different key generation centers (KGC). This extension is of particular interest in the case of Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks where nodes from different authorities might be required to communicate securely.
The full version shows that the mOT protocol and its extension from [27] can be modified to work as "traditional" (i.e., not ID-based) key agreement protocol.
Related work. Key agreement protocols (KAPs) have played an important role in the development of identity-based cryptography, with Okamoto [22] , Okamoto and Tanaka [23] , Gunther [13] being early examples of id-based cryptography.
(Even earlier, the work by Blom [2] on key distribution can be seen as a precursor of id-based schemes.) With the flourishing of pairings-based cryptography, many more idbased KAPs have been designed; yet getting them right has been a challenging task. See the survey by Boyd and Choo [3] and Chen, Cheng, and Smart [6] for good descriptions and accounts of the main properties of many of these protocols. Even to date it seems that very few (e.g., [4] , [31] ) were given full proofs of security (many others were broken or enjoy only a restricted notion of security, such as partial resistance to known-key attacks). In all, the mOT protocol studied here compares very favorably with other id-based and traditional KAPs in provability and security properties (e.g., PFS) as well as performance-wise.
We already discussed the relationship of our work with [16] . We stress again that the security analysis there is for the protocol with the extra key confirmation messages, while we analyze the minimalistic 2-message protocol in Figure 1 .
Multi-domain extensions of id-based KAPs have been proposed in [7] , [20] but without full proofs of security. The multi-domain extension of the mOT protocol that we fully analyze here is from Schridde et al. [27] which also contains a good discussion of the benefits of multi-domain identitybased protocols.
In general, while interactive authenticated KAPs, especially those authenticated with signatures, can easily accommodate certificates (which a party can send together with its signature), avoiding the need for certificates constitutes a significant practical simplification of many systems. In particular, they provide more convenient solutions for revocation and less management burden [30] . The Okamoto-Tanaka example shows that the identity-based setting can sometimes even improve performance.
Open questions. We believe that the mOT protocol is remarkable for its "minimalism", providing full and provable authenticated key-agreement security (including full PFS) with the same communication and minimal computational overhead relative to the underlying unauthenticated DHP. Yet there are several ways one could hope to improve on this protocol and on our results; achieving any of these improvements would bring us even closer to the "ultimate" authenticated DHP: (i) Find a protocol with the same communication/computation/security characteristics as mOT but which works over arbitrary dlog groups (in particular elliptic curves). In this case, the minimalism of mOT would translate into optimal practical performance (even a certificate-based protocol with these properties would be very useful). (ii) Prove the full PFS security of mOT without resorting to nonblack-box assumptions (while we believe that proofs under these assumptions carry a very strong evidence of security, using more standard assumptions is obviously desirable). (iii) Improve on mOT by avoiding the vulnerability of the protocol to the exposure of the DH values g x , g y or the ephemeral exponents x, y.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let SP RIM ES(n) be the set of n-bit long safe primes. Recall that a prime p is safe if p−1 2 is prime. Let N = pq be the product of two random primes in SP RIM ES(n); denote p = 2p ′ + 1 and q = 2q ′ + 1. Let e be an integer which is relatively prime to ϕ(N ) = 4p ′ q ′ . We say that the RSA Assumption (with exponent e) holds if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A the probability that A on input N, e, R, where R ∈ R Z * N , outputs x such that x e = R mod N is negligible in n. The probability of success of A is taken over the random choices of p, q, R and the coin tosses of A.
Throughout the paper we use the following well-known result of Shamir [25] :
Lemma 1: Let N, e, d be RSA parameters and f be an integer relatively prime to e. There is an efficient procedure that given N, e, f (but not d) and a value (
The cyclic group QR N . If N is an RSA modulus product of safe primes, then the subgroup QR N of quadratic residues in Z * N is cyclic of order p ′ q ′ . Let g be a random generator of QR N (such generator can be found by squaring a random element in Z * N (this algorithm yields a generator with overwhelming probability and the resulting distribution is statistically close to uniform). In protocols and proofs below we are going to generate random elements in the group generated by g according to the uniform distribution and with known exponents (i.e., their dlog to the base g). Such a random element X could be generated by choosing an integer Let g be a random generator of QR N and let X = g x mod N and Y = g y mod N two random elements in QR N . We say that the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption (for N and g) holds if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A the probability that A on input N, g, X, Y outputs Z such that Z = g xy mod N is negligible in n. The probability of success of A is taken over the random choices of p, q, x, y and the coin tosses of A. We know from [28] that the hardness of factoring N (and therefore the RSA Assumption) implies the CDH Assumption.
III. THE MODIFIED OKAMOTO-TANAKA PROTOCOL
Protocol Setup. A key generation center KGC (for "trusted authority") chooses an RSA key (N, e, d) , where N is the product of two safe primes p, q. As usual e, d are such that ed = 1 mod ϕ(N ). The KGC also chooses a random generator g for the subgroup of quadratic residues QR N . The public key of the KGC is (N, e, g ) and its secret key is d. Two hash functions H, H ′ are public parameter. The first function H outputs elements in the group generated by g (this can be achieved by setting H to be the square modN of another hash function with range Z * N ). The second hash function H ′ outputs k-bit strings, where k is the length of the required session key.
Each user in the system has an identity; for convenience we sometimes associate a name to an identity. For example, Alice will be the name of a party while her identity is denoted 
Since we want both parties to compute the same session key we need to determine an ordering between id A and id B , and between α and β in the input to the hash; for example, a lexicographic ordering (note that we are not assuming necessarily that there is a definite role of "initiator" and "responder" in the protocol, and hence we do not use such roles to determine the ordering of the above values). Protection of ephemeral values. We specify that the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman values X, Y chosen by the parties be given the same protection level as the private keys S A , S B (indeed, learning these ephemeral values is equivalent to learning the private keys). In particular, if these values are stored in the (less secure) session state they need to be stored encrypted under a (possibly symmetric) key stored with the private key. (This is analogous to the need for protecting the ephemeral value k in a DSA signature.) In addition, we specify that in the computation of the session key, the hashing of the valuē K be performed in protected memory and only the session key be exported to a session state or application (learning the shared secretK value opens some attack venues as explained in the full version).
The exponents set S and performance considerations. The performance cost of the protocol is dominated by the exponentiation operations; hence the choice of the set S from which ephemeral exponents are selected is important. A first choice would be to define S as the interval [1..⌊ √ N /2⌋]. In this case, as shown in [12] (following the results in [15] ), the two distributions
are computationally indistinguishable under the assumption that factoring N is hard. Therefore, one can use exponents of length half the modulus without any loss in security. However, performance can be significantly improved by setting S to be the set of exponents of length κ, where κ is twice the security parameter (e.g., κ = 224). Indeed in this case, the security of the protocol relies on the common assumption that discrete log (over Z * N ) is hard also when the exponents are of length κ. Indeed (see Lemma 3.6 in [12] ), this assumption implies that the two distributions
are computationally indistinguishable, and hence using the short or long exponents is equivalent. Therefore, we recommend the protocol to be implemented using short exponents; in particular, we use this case when discussing the protocol's performance.
A. Proof of the mOT Protocol
We prove first the following theorem showing the basic security of the mOT protocol. In the full paper we prove further security properties, namely, resistance to KCI and to reflection attacks, and weak PFS. We defer the proof of full PFS (which requires a more involved proof and additional assumptions) to the full version.
Theorem 1: Under the RSA assumption, if we model H, H
′ as random oracles, the mOT protocol is a secure identitybased key agreement protocol. Proof: The proof is carried in the Canetti-Krawczyk KeyAgreement security model [5] (a succinct summary of this model is presented in the full version) and it follows a typical simulation/reduction argument: We assume an efficient KAattacker M that breaks the security of the mOT protocol and use it to build an algorithm that inverts RSA on random inputs.
We start by noting the following fact about an attacker against mOT: Since the session identifier (id A , id B , α, β) is hashed together with the shared secret valueK to obtain the session key K, we know that two different sessions necessarily correspond to two different session keys. Moreover, since the hash function H ′ is modelled as a random oracle then the only way for the attacker to calculate, identify, or distinguish a session key is by computing the valueK and explicitly querying it from H ′ . 2 We call the algorithm that we build for inverting RSA a "simulator" (denoted SIM ) since it works by simulating a run of the mOT protocol against the KA-attacker M which is assumed to win the test-session game with non-negligible probability. Input to SIM . The input to SIM is a triple (N, e, R) Of all party identities participating in the protocol, SIM chooses one at random; we denote it by id B and will refer to this party as Bob. For each participant id P other than Bob, SIM chooses a random value p ∈ R QR N and sets P = H(id P ) = p e . In this way, SIM also knows the private key of the participant, i.e., S P = P d = p (note that P and S P are elements of QR N ). For Bob, SIM sets H(id B ) = B = R 2 mod N , where R is the input to SIM (note that R 2 is random in QR N ). Choosing a QR N generator. SIM sets the random generator g of QR N to be used in the protocol as following: it chooses randomr ∈ R QR N , sets r =r e , and g = (rB) e . Note that with these choices B = g d /r andr = r d ; also note that g and B are random in QR N and independent. Guessed test session. Before starting the simulation of session establishments, SIM chooses at random a (future) session that it conjectures will be chosen by M as the test session. SIM does so by guessing the holder of the test session among all the parties in the orchestrated protocol run (we refer to this party as Alice) and guessing the order number of the session among all of Alice's sessions. This allows SIM to know when the guessed session is activated at Alice in the protocol's run. In addition, SIM also guesses that the peer to the test session will be Bob (defined above). We specify that, if at any point in SIM 's simulation, it is determined from the protocol's run that the guessed session is not to be chosen as the real test session by M (e.g., if either Alice or Bob are corrupted, or another test session is chosen by M, etc.) the simulator aborts. The probability that the guessed session will actually be chosen by M as the test session is non-negligible (as long as the simulation of the protocol by SIM is correct). Session Interactions (non-test sessions) . Attacker M can choose to initiate and schedule sessions between any two participants and can input its own values into the various sessions, either by utilizing corrupted players or by delivering messages allegedly coming from honest parties. The simulator SIM needs to act on behalf of honest parties in these interactions. Simulating the actions of any uncorrupted party other than Bob is simple for SIM , as it knows their private keys and can choose their ephemeral exponents. Sessions in which Bob is a participant are more problematic since SIM does not know Bob's private key S B = B d . Whenever Bob is activated in a session, SIM will set the value β = g b /r as the outgoing message from Bob where b ∈ R [1..⌊N/4⌋] is chosen afresh with each activation of Bob and the valuer is fixed and defined above. Clearly, β is distributed uniformly over QR N as in the real runs of mOT. While SIM cannot compute session keys with such choice of β we will still see that it can answer the attacker's session-key queries.
Response to party corruption and session key queries (non-test sessions).
If at any point M corrupts a party, SIM provides all information for that party including the private key (which SIM knows). Note that if the attacker asks to corrupt Bob, SIM aborts since it is a sign that SIM did not guess correctly the test session. Session-key queries for sessions where one of the messages was generated by an honest party other than Bob, can be answered by SIM who chooses the ephemeral exponent for the session. The problematic cases are sessions where Bob is a peer and for which the incoming message to Bob was chosen by the attacker (rather than by SIM itself), and provided to Bob as coming from some party id C (we refer to it as Charlie), which may be honest or corrupted, but different than Bob 3 . In this case SIM does not know the ephemeral exponents of either party to the session so it cannot compute the session key. Instead the simulation proceeds as follows.
The idea is that as long as M does not query the session valueK from the random oracle H ′ , then SIM can answer the session key query with a random value. However, if M does know the valueK, and it actually queries H ′ on this value, then SIM needs to answer consistently. Specifically, we are dealing with a session where the peers are Bob and Charlie, whose hashed identities are B = H(id B ) and C = H(id C ), respectively, and the exchanged values are γ, chosen by the attacker, and β chosen by SIM as specified above. Thus, the session key is H ′ (K, id C , id B , γ, β) for the appropriately computedK. Before answering the session-key query, SIM needs to check whether an input of the form (Q, id C , id B , γ, β) was queried from H ′ where Q =K. If such a query with Q =K was indeed performed then SIM will answer the session-key query with the existing value
If not, SIM will choose a random value ρ in the range of H ′ and will return ρ as the value of the session key.
The main question is how will SIM verify whether Q =K for a prior query. The valueK can be represented as DH g (Z 2 , β e /B) for Z = γ/S C . By our choice of B = g d /r, β = g b /r and r =r e , we have that
Now, since exponentiation to the e is a permutation over Z * N , we have that Q =K if and only if Q e =K e , and by Equation (1) Simulating the test session. When M activates the session at Alice that SIM chose as its guess for the test session, SIM acts as follows. Let the identity of Alice be id A and denote A = H(id A ). Since Alice is assumed to be the holder of the test session, it means that it is Alice (or SIM in our case) who chooses the outgoing message α from the session, not the attacker. SIM sets this message to the value α = (rB) f S A , where r, B are as described at the begining of the simulation, S A = A d is Alice's private key (which SIM knows) and f is chosen as f = te+1 for t ∈ R [1..⌊N/4⌋]. With this choice, α's distribution is statistically close to uniform over QR N . Indeed, we have (rB
.⌊N/4⌋] (recall that in the real protocol Alice chooses α = g x S A with g x also statistically close to uniform distribution over QR N ). It also makes it independent of other values in the protocol including B and β.
The peer to the test session is Bob (or else SIM aborts) and the incoming message is denoted by β. This value can be chosen by the attacker (which delivers it to Alice as coming from Bob) or by Bob itself. In the latter case, β is chosen by SIM as described above for other sessions activated at Bob. In case M chooses β, it can be any arbitrary value. Below, we make no assumption on β other than being in Z * N . The session key in this case is K = H ′ (K, id A , id B , α, β) whereK is computed as follows: if X = g x denotes the value α/S A then K = (β e /B) 2x . Now, by our choice of parameters α, g, B, r
and hence x = df mod ϕ(N )/4. Thus, 4 We note for future reference, that knowing S C is not strictly necessary for SIM to carry this simulation step. If SIM does not know S C (as in some other proofs in this paper) it does not know Z either. Instead SIM will use Z e = γ e /C which it does know, and instead of checking Q e = Z 2(e d . Finally, we note that in order to win the test-session game with non-negligible advantage it must be that M queries the correctK from H with non-negligible probability, then SIM is guaranteed to learnK, and hence compute R d , also with non-negligible probability.
In the full version we prove further security properties of mOT , such as resistance to reflection and key compromise attacks. We also present the proof of the PFS property.
B. Performance
The mOT protocol, when used with short exponents, is very efficient; in particular more efficient than any RSAbased key agreement protocol and any authenticated DiffieHellman protocol over Z * p for large prime. It is also much more efficient than any of the id-based protocols based on pairings. Yet, today's most efficient (certificate-based) key agreement protocols, such as MQV, run over elliptic curves while mOT runs over RSA composites. How do these protocols compare? In terms of operations, mOT uses one off-line and one online exponentiation per party (both with short exponents, say 160 or 224 bits). The e-th power computation (with e = 3) in mOT is essentially negligible. MQV uses the same two exponentiations plus an additional on-line "half exponentiation" (i.e., half the number of multiplications compared to a full exponentiation). Thus, the on-line cost for MQV is 1.5 exponentiations per party compared to 1 in mOT. If in the case of MQV one uses ECDSA-signed certificates (assuming a full ECC implementation) then MQV may incur an additional cost of at least one on-line exponentiation for certificate verification (making it a total of at least 2.5 on-line exponentiations per party compared to 1 exponentiation in mOT). We have not run precise simulations but extrapolating from performance data (e.g., [8] ) one can see that for moderate security parameters (say 1024-bit RSA) mOT may have a computational advantage while for larger moduli (say above 2000 bits) the advantage is on the elliptic curve side.
Regarding communication, mOT sends a single group element, say of size 2048. MQV sends a single group element, say of size 224, plus a certificate. If MQV's certificate is signed with, say, RSA-2048 then verification computation is negligible but MQV's message is larger than mOT's (especially that RSA certificates are usually significantly larger than the 2048-bit signature on them [24] ). If instead the certificate is signed with ECDSA then the certificate will be shorter than RSA's but the computational complexity of verification increases by at least one exponentiation as discussed above. Finally, we recall the PFS security advantage of mOT; in MQV this can be achieved but only at the cost of a third message in the protocol.
IV. A MULTI-AUTHORITY EXTENSION OF mOT AND ITS SECURITY
Schridde, Smith and Freisleben [27] show how to extend the Okamoto-Tanaka protocol to the multi-authority (or multidomain) case, in which users from two separate and independent key generation centers (or trusted authorities) can still establish a secret key. This extension is of particular interest in the case of Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks where nodes from different authorities might be required to communicate securely.
Our description below incorporates required modification to ensure the security and proof of the protocol. We also make a change to improve its efficiency. In the rest of the paper we will refer to this as the SSF protocol. . We assume that the identities of the parties include a description of the T A they belong to (e.g. in this case id A would include N i , e i , g i ). In the following, Alice and Bob are two parties from T A 1 and T A 2 , respectively, and they want to generate a shared key. We assume the T A i have chosen safe primes in the generation of their moduli, i.e. we assume that p i = 2p 
The Key Exchange
Let E = lcm(e 1 , e 2 ). Both parties compute the following values mod N 1 N 2 using the Chinese Remainder Theorem: The set S of ephemeral exponents. The choice of the set S follows similar criteria as in the case of the basic mOT protocol (Section III). The order of the elementĝ is p
which is closely approximated by ⌊N 1 N 2 /16⌋, so by choosing S to be the integers in the interval [1..⌊N 1 N 2 /16⌋] one generates a distribution statistically close to uniform over ⟨ĝ⟩. This can be improved, as in the case of the basic mOT protocol and following [15] , [12] , by choosing the much smaller interval [1..⌊ √ N 1 N 2 /4⌋] which results in a distribution that is computationally indistinguishable from uniform over ⟨ĝ⟩. However, also as in the basic mOT case and following [12] , if one assumes that over Z * N discrete log is hard for exponents of length κ, then the SSF protocol is secure even if S is chosen as the set of integers of length κ (typically, one would choose κ to be 160 or 224). We recommend this choice of S in practice. Modifications to the original protocol from [27] . Following the modifications introduced by [16] to the original OkamotoTanaka protocol, here also we need to modify from [27] in order to ensure the security of the protocol and its proof. One modification, similar to the mOT case, is the computation of the session key via hashing the shared valueK A =K B together with the session information using H ′ . We note that the hashing of identities using H, when computing the secret keys, was already incorporated to the protocol description in [27] and hence that part did not require modification.
Another change we introduce is to use E as the exponent to compute the session key, while in [27] the product e 1 e 2 is used. Our choice clearly improves performance, as in general E can be much smaller than the product.
Finally two more changes were made to the original protocol from [27] : (i) in [27] the valueĝ is computed as g 1 · g 2 mod N 1 N 2 while we use the CRT to defineĝ; (ii) the value of the secret value shared by the parties before hashing is squared, i.e.ĝ 2Exy while in [27] isĝ e1e2xy . We are not aware of any attacks if one does not incorporate these last two modifications, but we were able to devise a proof only with them.
